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In the Supreme O.ourl of the Stale of Utah 
PHlTDl~NTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
a torporation, 
Plaintiff and Rrspondent, 
VS. 
TH1£ ST. PAUL INSURANCE 
('.()~f P ANIES, 
Def cndant and Apvellant 
and 
FIRS'l' Al\IERICAN TITLI~ INSUR-
A0.' CE AND TRFST COMPANY, 
Def cndant and Respondrnt. 
Case No. 
10765 
APPELLANT'S REPILY BRIEF 
I. REPLY TO RESPONDENT PRUDENTIAL 
FI£DERAL'S BRIEF 
RPspondent Prudential's statement of facts and the 
argunwnt throughout the brief, refer to appellant's bond 
as a "fidelity bond." This is grossly inaccurate, for the 
honJ is a ''Savings, Building and Loan Association 
Blankd Bond with ExtendPd Coverages (R-104)," with 
lllany ron•rages including fidelity. This is important, 
for as shO\rn in appellant's brief, point II, pages 16 and 
17, lilankd policiPs only supplernt>nt specific insurance 
and arv Pxress to s1wcific insurance. 
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Respondent Prudential's brief, in its statement of 
facts, page 2, says "No dispute exists ... that the said 
fidelity bond was before the court though not introduced 
actually in evidence by stipulation until after the order 
was made by the court." Dispute certainly does exist, 
for the record is clear appellant's bond was not before 
the Trial Court when it entered its summary judgment. 
As pointed out in appellant's brief, page 12, it ·was not 
offered in evidence until three months after the sum-
mary judgment was entered. ·without a11pellant's bond 
before it, the trial court could not haw construed appel-
lant's bond and determined its liability thereon. 
Respondent Prudential's brief, page 3, irnplieos ap-
pellant asserts as its sole defense the "other insurance" 
provisions of its policy. Appellant has ahva>-s and con-
tinues to assert additionally that plaintiff has suffered 
no loss. See appellant's brief, point I. 
Respondent Prudential's brief, page 5, notes no 
cross-claim was filed by appellant against respondent 
First American, and says "hence, the court was bound 
to make a determination predicated upon the Complaint 
itself ... ". Of course no cross-claim was filed agaiHst 
First American because appf'llant St. Paul does not 
claim and cannot claim respondent First Am<>rican i' 
liable to it. As shown by appellant's brit>f, page -ti. 
plaintiff deliberately stated no claim against tlir• ti!k 
insurer, for the simple reason that the title insun'r·, 
agents' counsel is no\v appearing for lilai11tiff (R-78, ?)) 
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Appellant alleged in its answer, paragraph 8, "that First 
American Title Insurance Company, not defendant, is 
liable to plaintiff (R-5 ). " There can be no doubt that 
respondent First American has an interest in the declar-
atory judgment, as required by Section 78-33-11, U.C.A. 
1953, ·which provides: 
"When declaratory relief is sought, all per-
so1ls shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which may be affected by the decelara-
tion .... " (Emphasis added) 
This section is not discretionary; it says, in effect, First 
American "shall" be made a party. Upon that statute, 
the District Court ordered respondent First American 
joined as a party defendant. In light of that statute and 
appellant's ans\ver, alleging First American, not appel-
lant, is liable to plaintiff, it simply does not follow that 
''the Court was bound to make its determination predi-
cated npon the Complaint itself, which was solely for 
dedaratory relief as to the interpretation of the language 
of the fidelity bond" (Plaintiff's brief, page 5). Indeed, 
the rxact contrary is true, and the trial court was bound 
to determine whether respondent First American was 
liahl<> to plaintiff even though no cross-claim, as such, 
\\"as filed against n•spondent Fi.rst American. 
HPspondent Prudential's brif'f, page 12, says: 
"After evaluating the problem, Prudential 
el<>drd to seek a judicial determination and has 
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by its complaint alleged its position that appel-
lant St. Paul is liable under the fidelity bon<l. 
Prudential does not believe the policy exclusion 
gives St. Paul an escape from the clear-cut terms 
of the covering, insuring clause." 
That simply is contrary to fact. Plaintiff did make 
formal demand on Security Title Company, respondent 
First American's agent (R-77). Security Title Company 
has paid all of the monthly payment owing on the prior 
mortgage (R-73, 74). This shows that not only does 
Prudential believe appellant is not liable and that re-
spondent First American is, it also shows that the title 
company thinks so too. Of coursE>, what the parties 
think or believe is immaterial. The question is, who is 
liable. The title company in effect admits its liability 
by paying the first mortgage. The actions of Prudential 
and the title company speak far louder than the above-
quoted language by the title company's counsel, now 
appearing for plaintiff Prudential. 
The whole gist of respondent Prudential's argument 
is summed up on pages 12 and 13 of its brief, which says 
St. Paul is not excused from liability " ( 1) because th~ 
policy of title insurance does not cover the type of 108~ 
or losses indemnified by this bond, and (2) because tlw 
title policy may be unenforcable as the title insurer 
asserts that it was issued as a n•sult of a mistake of a 
material face, and ( 3) was not intended to cover em-
bezzlement risks which St. Paul claims." (numeral~ 
added). Let us analyze these three ela ims separn t<:' ly. 
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First, it begs the issue of whether the title insurer 
is liable to say the title policy does not cover the type 
of loss covered by the appellant's bond. 
Second, the title insurer cannot escape liability even 
if the policy was issued as a result of a mistake as to 
whether the prior first mortgage had been released, for 
the title policy excludes only prior liens "not known to 
thP company or not shown by the public records," and 
this prior mortgage was sho\Yn by the public record and 
was known to the title company. Obviously title policies 
would he worthless if the title insurer could avoid liabil-
ity every time it made a mistah. The title insurer is 
paid not to make such mistakes. 
rrhird, plaintiff says the title policy was not intended 
to cover embezzlement risks. That totally ignores Point 
II of appellant's brief, which shows it was not the em-
bez.zlement of which plaintiff complains in its complaint, 
hut instead it is the loss of priority of its trust deed. 
The title policy was intended to cover the risk of loss 
of priority of the trust deed, and St. Paul's blanket bond 
was not intended to cover that risk. 
Respondent's Prudential's brief, page 17, argues 
that where an agent acts fraudently and adversely to 
llH' principal, his knowledge is still imputed to the 
pri11l'ipal if the agent is the sole representative of the 
pri11<'ipal in the transaction. Tlwre is no evidence here 
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that Rowley was the sole agent. Further, the reason for 
the "sole representative rule" is that when the agent is 
the only one who acts for the principal, there is no other 
way for the principal to claim except through that agent 
and hence, all his kno-wledge, good or bad, is the prin-
cipal's. The rule has no application here berause Rowley 
had nothing at all to do with the issuanre of the titlr 
policy. Security Title Company, respondf'nt First Ameri-
can's agent, simply issued it on its own accord when 
Security saw the release of the Buffo second rnortgagP 
(which it had ovf'rlooked in its prf'liminary title rt>port) 
and mistook it for the rf'lf'ase of the first mortgagl' of 
First Federal Savings ( R-9-1, 95). PrndPntial can daim 
and has claimed against thP title company without 
relying on any acts of Rowle~v, and tlw title rornpany 
has recognized that elaim h!:'rf'. Moreover, pursuant to 
the authorities cited in app<•llant's brief, pagf's +1 anJ 
42, Security Title knew or was bound to know Rowle~­
was acting adversely to Prudential and was exceeding 
his authority. It therc>fore had sufficit>nt warning of 
lack of authorization, precluding it from imputing 
Rowley's knowledge and Rowley's aets to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 18, argues that Rowlry':-: 
embezzlement occurred before tlw title poliey was issueJ 
and therefore appellant's policy rowrcd the defalcation. 
As pointed out in page 39 of ap1wllant 's briPf, tlw 
measuring time for determining wlii<'h irnrnr0r is liabl1• 
is when the loss was discon'l't>d, Hot "·lH'n it oe<·nn('ll. 
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for appellant's bond (R-10-±) provides coverage against 
losses which "shall happen at any time but which are 
discovPred by the insured subsequent to noon of the date 
hereof." No liability occurs under appellant's bond until 
the loss is discovered. Discovery was made after the 
title policy was issued. 
The only authority cited by respondent Prudential 
Federal's brief, at page 13 thereof, supporting its "same 
risk" argument, an• a few encyclopedia citations which 
have already been distinguished in appellant's brief at 
pag-e :12. 
TT. REPLY TO RESPONDENT FIRST 
Al\fERTCAN'S BRIEF 
R0spondent First American bases its sole argument 
on the proposition that "there is 'other insurance' only 
wlwn~ the insured und0rtakes to insure the same thing 
twice against the same perils." It cites only t"·o cases, 
and neitlwr is appropriate>. 
'T'he brief, page 8, cites Blu(' Aurhor Overall Co., Inc. 
I'. Pennsylvania Lumberman's lllutual Ins. Co. (Pa., 
105G) 123 A.2d -±13, 59 A.L.R. 2d 5-±G for the proposition 
that there is other insurance only when the two policies 
r·o\'<•r the same risk. There, the cause of the insured's 
loss \\·as leakage from fire protective equipment. De-
f1·n<lant 's poliey roven•d loss from fire and loss from 
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fire leakage equipment and other policies covered onl,1· 
fire loss but not loss from leakage of fire protective 
equipment. The court specifically said: 
"Since defendant's insurance policy is the 
only one which protects from the risk of loss due 
to leakage from fire protective equipment, it 
would seem clear that plaintiff's other fire insur-
ance policies, being for a different risk, would 
not constitute other insurance.'' 
Here, the loss sustained by plaintiff was the loss of 
priority of its mortgage, against which respondent First 
American insured. In the Blue Anchor ease, the claimed 
"other insurance'' did not even cover the loss actually 
sustained. In that case the condition of only dPfendant'~ 
insurance policy was breached; in this case the condition 
of both policies was breached. Obviously, the Blur 
Anchor case sheds no light on the problm1 at bar. 
Respondent's brief, page 9, cites United States 
Guaranty Company v. Liberty Mutual Insiirance Com-
pany (Wisc., 1943) 12 N.\V.2d 59, 150 A.L.R. G32, for 
the proposition: 
"With respect to the claimed doctrine of 
'specific and general insurance' the cases all _d_cal 
with a general insurer with an Pxpress proV1~1?1~ 
in his policy that if there is other more 's1wed1c 
insurance or other insurance covering t71e S({/111' 
risk (emphasis theirs), that thP gt'11pral in:-:nrrr 
. " will be considered only an Pxee:-:s ms1Her. 
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That case does not support respondent's proposition, and 
actually supports appellant's position. There, an em-
ployee of a subcontractor of the insured was run into 
on the insured's premises by one of the insured's motor 
vehicles. The insured had an automobile policy with 
plaintiff and a public liability policy with defend-
ant which insured against hazards arising when mem-
bers of the public came on the insured's premises. Each 
policy "provided that if the assured carried a policy 
of another insurer against loss and expense covered by 
its agreement . . . '' then the policies would be appor-
tioned. Neither policy said anything about there being 
"other more 'specific' insurance or other insurance 
covering the same risk," as respondent's brief claims. 
Instead, the policies each said "if the assured carried a 
policy of other insurance against loss and expense cov-
err,d by this agreement, ... " which is virtually identical 
to the language in appellant's policy. Even though one 
policy covered motor vehicles and the other covered 
puhlic liability, the court there held "the purpose of 
each contract was to cover the loss in question," and 
required apportionment. It is submitted there is no dif-
fermce between an automobile policy and a public lia-
bility policy, both covering liability for personal injury, 
and a blanket savings and loan bond and a title policy, 
both of which cover loss of priority of mortgage. There 
th(• anto policy covered autos and the public liability 
poliry covered nwrnhPrs of the public; to that extent, 
it ronld he said "the risks are different" just as re-
"] 1011dpnb5 here say one policy covers embezzlements and 
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the other covers title insurance. But here, as in the cited 
case, "the purpose of each policy was to cover the loss 
in question." In the cited cases, the policies were appor-
tioned; here they cannot be apportioned because ap11el-
lant 's bond is "excess." But the point still exists that 
each policy covers the actual loss sustained in both thl' 
cited case and the case at bar, and,· therefore, policies 
can cover the same risk even though they are different 
types of policies. 
Respondent First American's brief, page 9, simply 
glosses over the whole issue when it says at pages 9 
and 10: 
"The St. Paul policy does not expressly refer 
to other more 'specific' insurance, but of course 
it does ref er to other insurance covering the samr 
risk (that is, 'other insurance covering any loss, 
covered hereunder') (Punctuation theirs). 
The St. Paul policy does not say "other indemnity against 
any risk, covered hereunder," it says "other loss." Re-
spondents would simply reword appellant's contract for 
it, notwithstanding their citation of authority that pro-
visions of insurance contracts are to be construed in 
the sense in which they are ordinarily used, and unalll-
biguous terms in an insuranct> policy arr to be tak<>n in 
their plain, ordinary and popular senst>( brief, pagP S). 
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CONCLUSION 
Both respondents would ( 1) look only to appellant's 
policy and (2) say appellant is not excused because the 
title policy is not other indemnity within appellant's 
policy because the risks insured are not the same. Point 
two is wrong, first because appellant's policy says "if 
the insured carries any other indemnity against loss, 
hereunder" then its policy is excess. It does not say 
"if the insured carries any other fidelity indemnity 
against any risk, covered hereunder." Point two is 
wrong, ::,;econd, because there is no logical reason to 
apply respondent's rule in this instance. Why shouldn't 
the title policy be looked to even if the risks insured 
in the two policies aren't the same? Point two is wrong, 
third, because it is clear that both policies do cover this 
loss, as the condition of each policy has been breached. 
Fourth, it is wrong because respondents cite absolutely 
no authority for their position, other than a few en-
eyclo1iedia citations taken out of context and not appli-
l'ilhle to the facts here. w·hen the cases themselves are 
examined on their facts, it is seen that the cases support 
appellant. 
However, assertion of point two simply begs the 
rral issuc' in this cas<:>. Tlw real issue is which insurer 
is liahk', and it is not 'is appellant excused from liability,' 
as rPspon<l<,nts "'onld likP. In otlwr words, there is 
absoluU•ly no reason why appt>llant's policy must be 
lo1ib·d to fir::,;t and s1i1Ply. If the title policy is looked 
12 
to first and liability found, then appellant's bond i~ 
moot. It is respectfully submitted that the title policy of 
respondent First American should be looked to first, be-
cause (1) the title company is already paying plaintiff'8 
loss, thereby admitting its liability; (2) the title policy 
covers the cause of plaintiff's loss, the loss of priorit>-
of its mortgage; the title policy is far more casually 
connected with the loss plaintiff claims than is appellant'' 
bond; (3) the title policy is specific in that it covl'rs 
only the priority of plaintiff's trust deed, whereas the 
blanket savings and loan bond of appellant has man~ 
coverages and its fidelity coverage is only incidental and 
secondary; and (4) appellant's bond expressly says it 
is excess. lt must be remembered that First Arneriran 
did insure plaintiff's mortgage as a first mortgage, that 
it is not a first mortgage, that the title policy has bt'en 
breached and that it is entirely fortuitous to respondl'Ht 
First American that plaintiff happened to have blanket 
coverage which incidentally included fidelity coverage. 
Neither respondent saw fit to answer the question 
of why the title policy should not be considered. They 
seek only to look to appellant's blanket bond. Their 
reasoning is obvious; their interests are the same, anrl 
this is merely an action by the title company, tlw title 
insurer's agent, seeking to 11ass tlte title company'' 
liability, already assumed through payrnPnt of the 
monthly payments on the first mortgage, off to anotlil'l' 
by the device of having its lm\7Pr n'pr<>~mt plaintiff 
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'The summary judgment in favor of respondents and 
the order dismissing respondent First American for fail-
ure to state a claim against it should therefore be re-
yersed, appellant should be awarded its costs on appeal, 
and the case should be remanded for determination of 
the title insurer's liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNO-W 
& CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
